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EASTWOOD’S ANSWER TO ALEJANDRE’S OPEN 
QUESTION: THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE SHOULD NOT 
BAR FRAUD CLAIMS 
Katherine Heaton 
Abstract: The economic loss rule is a judicially created doctrine that bars plaintiffs from 
suing in tort for purely economic losses when the entitlement to recovery arises only from a 
contract. In Alejandre v. Bull, the Washington State Supreme Court acknowledged that there 
are exceptions to the rule but explicitly declined to say whether it would recognize an 
exception for fraud. Washington’s appellate courts answered Alejandre’s open question, 
holding that the economic loss rule barred all fraud claims except for the narrow tort of 
fraudulent concealment. The appellate courts interpreted Alejandre broadly to apply the 
economic loss rule whenever the parties had a contractual relationship and the losses were 
purely economic. The Washington State Supreme Court responded to these appellate 
decisions in Eastwood v. Horse Harbor Foundation. In Eastwood, the Court explicitly 
rejected the appellate courts’ broad view of Alejandre and held that the economic loss rule 
does not bar a plaintiff from bringing a tort claim where the tort duty is independent of the 
contract. This Comment argues that, in light of Eastwood, Washington’s economic loss rule 
should not bar fraud claims because the duty not to commit fraud is independent of any 
contract. 
INTRODUCTION 
A newlywed couple awoke to violent shaking and a horrible cracking 
noise as their cliff-side home started falling into the sea. They had 
purchased the house just a few weeks earlier upon assurances that it was 
safe from landslides. When the newlyweds confronted the previous 
owner, he told them he had purposely built the house on low-cost fill 
even though he knew it was a landslide risk. He had lied about the risk to 
induce the newlyweds to buy his house. This is fraud. But under the 
Washington Court of Appeals holdings in Carlile v. Harbour Homes, 
Inc.1 and Poulsbo Group, LLC v. Talon Development, LLC,2 the 
economic loss rule would bar the newlyweds from recovering damages 
for this obvious tort. 
The doctrine that Washington courts once called the economic loss 
rule, and now call the independent duty doctrine, is a judicially created 
doctrine that bars plaintiffs from suing in tort for purely economic 
                                                     
1. 147 Wash. App. 193, 205–06, 194 P.3d 208, 286 (2008). 
2. 155 Wash. App. 339, 347, 229 P.3d 906, 910 (2010). 
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losses3 when the entitlement to recovery arises only from a contract.4 In 
Alejandre v. Bull,5 the Washington State Supreme Court held that the 
economic loss rule barred a homebuyer from bringing tort claims against 
the seller unless the tort was a recognized exception to the rule.6 The 
economic loss rule barred the plaintiffs’ negligence claim in Alejandre; 
however, the Court recognized an exception to the economic loss rule 
that would have allowed the plaintiffs to bring a fraudulent concealment 
claim.7 In a footnote, the Court mentioned that it was aware that some 
courts had found a broad exception to the economic loss rule that would 
allow plaintiffs to bring any fraud claim in tort, but the Court explicitly 
declined to say whether it would adopt such an exception.8 
Washington’s appellate courts wrestled with how to interpret Alejandre,9 
but ultimately decided that the economic loss rule barred all fraud claims 
except for fraudulent concealment.10 
                                                     
3. In Alejandre v. Bull, the Washington State Supreme Court defined economic losses as an injury 
in a contractual relationship “where the parties could or should have allocated the risk of loss, or 
had the opportunity to do so.” 159 Wash. 2d 674, 687, 153 P.3d 864, 870 (2007). Economic losses 
occur when the defendant’s action causes the plaintiff to lose money, or something of purely 
economic value, as opposed to suffering personal injury or injury to other property. Id. at 684, 153 
P.3d at 869. Some courts say that economic losses are more properly remedied in contract law 
because “[t]ort law has traditionally redressed injuries properly classified as physical harm.” Stuart 
v. Coldwell Banker Commercial Grp., Inc., 109 Wash. 2d 406, 420, 745 P.2d 1284, 1291 (1987). 
4. Alejandre, 159 Wash. 2d at 682, 153 P.3d at 868. 
5. 159 Wash. 2d 674, 153 P.3d 864 (2007). 
6. Id. at 685–86, 153 P.3d at 870. 
7. Id. at 691, 153 P.3d at 872–73. 
8. Id. at 690 n.6, 153 P.3d at 872 n.6. 
9. Compare Jackowski v. Borchelt, 151 Wash. App. 1, 17, 209 P.3d 514, 522 (2009) (citing 
Alejandre for the proposition that neither fraud nor fraudulent concealment claims are barred by the 
economic loss rule), and Stieneke v. Russi, 145 Wash. App. 544, 560, 190 P.3d 60, 68 (2008) 
(allowing the plaintiff to get to the merits of his fraud claim, because “[t]he Alejandre court 
reaffirmed that the economic loss rule does not apply to claims of fraud”), and Baddeley v. Seek, 
138 Wash. App. 333, 338, 156 P.3d 959, 961 (2007) (allowing the plaintiff to get to the merits of his 
fraud claim, because “[m]any outside jurisdictions have held the economic loss rule does not bar 
fraud”), with Carlile v. Harbour Homes, Inc., 147 Wash. App. 193, 204, 194 P.3d 280, 285 (2008) 
(interpreting Alejandre as creating an exception to the economic loss rule for fraudulent 
concealment but not other kinds of fraud). 
10. See Poulsbo Grp., LLC v. Talon Dev., LLC, 155 Wash. App. 339, 347, 229 P.3d 906, 910 
(2010); Carlile, 147 Wash. App. at 204–05, 194 P.3d at 285. Carlile discusses fraudulent 
concealment as though it were a completely separate tort from fraud. Id. This Comment argues that 
the appellate courts’ distinction between fraud and fraudulent concealment does not make sense 
because fraudulent concealment is just a shorthand name for one way of proving fraud, not a 
separate tort. See infra Part IV.C. 
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The Washington State Supreme Court clarified its economic loss rule 
in Eastwood v. Horse Harbor Foundation.11 In that case, the Court held 
that the economic loss rule does not bar a plaintiff from bringing a tort 
where the tort duty is independent of the contract.12 To underscore this 
point, and to help alleviate the appellate court confusion, the Court 
abandoned the term “economic loss rule” and renamed it the 
“independent duty doctrine.”13 The Court did not, however, explicitly 
state whether tort damages for fraud could be recovered under the newly 
renamed doctrine. 
This Comment argues that, contrary to the appellate court holdings in 
Carlile v. Harbour Homes, Inc.14 and Poulsbo Group, LLC v. Talon 
Development, LLC,15 Washington’s economic loss rule should not bar 
fraud claims,16 because the duty not to commit fraud is independent of 
any contract. Part I presents the origins of the economic loss rule and its 
underlying purpose. Part II discusses the variations in the rule and the 
three main approaches courts use to decide whether the rule bars fraud 
claims. Part III details the development and recent interpretation of the 
rule in Washington. Part IV argues that under Eastwood’s independent 
duty doctrine, a plaintiff should be able to recover damages from fraud 
for three reasons. First, barring fraud claims would create an uncertain 
marketplace because it is impossible for contracting parties to bargain 
against the risk of fraud. Second, under the Uniform Commercial Code 
(UCC), fraud claims supplement contract law rather than subvert it. 
Finally, Carlile and Poulsbo were based on a misunderstanding of 
Alejandre and the tort of fraud. Because fraud is always independent of a 
contract, these cases should be overruled. 
                                                     
11. 170 Wash. 2d 380, 387, 241 P.3d 1256, 1261 (2010) (“Seeing both a contractual relationship 
and an economic loss, the Court of Appeals believed that Alejandre therefore compelled a holding 
that Eastwood’s only remedy was a recovery for breach of lease. The Court of Appeals’ broad 
reading of this court’s jurisprudence on the economic loss rule, while perhaps understandable, is not 
correct.”). 
12. Id. at 393, 241 P.3d at 1264. 
13. Id. at 402, 241 P.3d at 1268. 
14. 147 Wash. App. at 205–06, 194 P.3d at 286. 
15. 155 Wash. App. at 347, 229 P.3d at 910. 
16. Fraud is an intentional tort with the following basic elements: (1) representation of an existing 
fact; (2) materiality; (3) falsity; (4) the speaker’s knowledge of its falsity; (5) intent of the speaker 
that it should be acted upon by the plaintiff; (6) plaintiff’s ignorance of its falsity; (7) plaintiff’s 
reliance on the truth of the representation; (8) plaintiff’s right to rely upon the representation; and 
(9) damages suffered by the plaintiff. W. Coast, Inc. v. Snohomish Cnty., 112 Wash. App. 200, 206, 
48 P.3d 997, 1000 (2002). 
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I. COURTS DEVELOPED THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE TO 
KEEP TORT LAW FROM CIRCUMVENTING CONTRACT 
LAW 
To understand the economic loss rule, it is instructive to understand 
its origins. Although some believe that the economic loss rule first 
developed in the context of products liability in the 1960s,17 the 
historical roots of the rule run much deeper.18 As far back as the 
nineteenth century, plaintiffs have tried to cast their contract claims as 
torts to avoid being denied recovery because of technical contract law 
reasons, such as an expired statute of limitations or the lack of privity 
between the parties.19 For as long as plaintiffs have tried to subvert 
negotiated contract terms with tort law, judges have been hostile to the 
use of tort claims to recover purely economic losses.20 As a result, 
judges developed the economic loss rule to police the boundary between 
tort and contract and “ensure that contract claims are resolved by 
contract law.”21 
To separate contract claims from tort claims, the economic loss rule 
bars a plaintiff from bringing a tort claim when the matter would be 
better resolved in contract.22 The critical distinction between tort law and 
contract law is the source of the duty.23 Contractual duties arise from 
agreements between the parties.24 The key assumption in contract law is 
that in the course of bargaining, contracting parties are able to allocate 
                                                     
17. See, e.g., R. Joseph Barton, Note, Drowning in a Sea of Contract: Application of the 
Economic Loss Rule to Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation Claims, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1789, 1794 (2000) (“The economic loss rule is a judicially created doctrine, first articulated by the 
California Supreme Court in Seely v. White Motor Co.”); Amanda K. Esquibel, The Economic Loss 
Rule and Fiduciary Duty Claims: Nothing Stricter than the Morals of the Market Place?, 42 VILL. 
L. REV. 789, 791 (1997).  
18. Sidney R. Barrett, Jr., Recovery of Economic Loss in Tort for Construction Defects: A Critical 
Analysis, 40 S.C. L. REV. 891, 897 (1989) (“The economic loss doctrine often is described as a 
creature of product defect litigation. Its historical roots, however, lie in the nineteenth century.”). 
19. Id. at 897–98 (“For as long as injured plaintiffs have been denied recovery in contract for 
reasons such as the expiration of statute of limitations for contract actions, lack of privity, 
unavailability of punitive damages, avoidance of contractual restrictions, or simply because the 
other contracting party is insolvent, resourceful lawyers have sought to recover in tort.”). 
20. Id. at 898. 
21. Dinsmore Instrument Co. v. Bombardier, Inc., 199 F.3d 318, 320 (6th Cir. 1999). 
22. See, e.g., Berschauer/Phillips Constr. Co. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 124 Wash. 2d 816, 822, 881 
P.2d 986, 990 (1994). 
23. See, e.g., Pa. Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165, 1169 (3d Cir. 1981); 
Barton, supra note 17, at 1796. 
24. See St. Denis v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 900 F. Supp. 1194, 1202 n.11 (D. Alaska 
1995). 
07 - 051911 Heaton Post Author Final Read.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/21/2011  7:41 PM 
2011] WASHINGTON’S ECONOMIC LOSS RULE 335 
 
risks and costs.25 For example, a buyer can choose to insist on additional 
warranties or to assume a greater risk in exchange for a lower price.26 
The role of contract law is to protect against the loss one party to a 
contract suffers when the other party fails to perform the bargained-for 
promise.27 
In contrast, tort duties arise from policy considerations.28 For 
example, the duty not to engage in fraud to induce the other party to 
contract comes from common sense, policy considerations, and case 
precedent.29 Unlike a warranty claim in contract law, the duty not to 
engage in fraud exists regardless of whether the contract is ultimately 
formed.30 Moreover, the tort duty may not be waived because parties 
cannot reasonably contemplate the risk of fraud.31 Tort law governs only 
the narrow subset of buyer-seller relationships where it is impractical, or 
impossible, to negotiate either the terms of a sale or each party’s duty to 
the other.32 
Despite the distinction between contract duties and tort duties, both a 
contract claim and a tort claim can arise from the same, or closely 
related, conduct.33 For example, a contract may require one party to 
deliver cows that are free of infection; thus, failure to do so would be a 
breach of contract.34 Under that contract, the defendant may be acting 
negligently by failing to test the cows when a reasonable person would 
have done so.35 Thus, the same action—failing to test the cows before 
delivery—gives rise to two claims: breach of contract and negligence.36 
Despite the fact that misrepresentations are fundamentally different from 
                                                     
25. See Neibarger v. Universal Coops., Inc., 486 N.W.2d 612, 615 (Mich. 1992). 
26. See Detroit Edison Co. v. NABCO, Inc., 35 F.3d 236, 240 (6th Cir. 1994). 
27. Christopher J. Faricelli, Note, Wading into the “Morass”: An Inquiry into the Application of 
New Jersey’s Economic Loss Rule to Fraud Claims, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 717, 722 (2004). 
28. See St. Denis, 900 F. Supp. at 1202 n.11. 
29. Eastwood v. Horse Harbor Found., 170 Wash. 2d 380, 389, 241 P.3d 1256, 1262 (2010) 
(“The existence of a duty is a question of law and depends on mixed considerations of logic, 
common sense, justice, policy, and precedent.” (citations omitted)). 
30. Barton, supra note 17, at 1830 (describing the similarities and differences between fraud and 
warranty claims). 
31. Id. If a party “cannot rely on the opposite party to speak truthfully during negotiations 
regarding the subject matter of the contract—if they cannot tell what is a lie and what is not,” then 
“[h]ow can parties freely allocate risk”? Budgetel Inns, Inc. v. Micros Sys., Inc., 8 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 
1148 (E.D. Wis. 1998). 
32. Detroit Edison Co. v. NABCO, Inc., 35 F.3d 236, 239 (6th Cir. 1994). 
33. Barton, supra note 17, at 1797. 
34. Hofstee v. Dow, 109 Wash. App. 537, 540–41, 36 P.3d 1073, 1075–76 (2001). 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
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broken promises,37 a party’s assertion of fact can also serve as that 
party’s implied promise to give some kind of satisfaction if the fact 
proves to be false.38 Thus, it can be difficult to distinguish between fraud 
(an intentional misrepresentation), remedied in tort, and a broken 
promise, remedied in contract.39 
Because a tort claim and a contract claim can arise from the same 
conduct, plaintiffs may be able to articulate their contract claims as tort 
claims.40 Casting a claim under tort law provides at least three 
advantages over contract law.41 First, contract law generally limits 
recovery to parties in privity of contract.42 On the other hand, tort law 
generally allows any injured party to recover.43 Second, a plaintiff may 
be able to bring a tort claim long after the statute of limitations has run 
on the analogous contract claim because, in tort law, the statute of 
limitations begins to run only after the plaintiff knew or should have 
known of the injury.44 Third, nearly every state allows punitive damages 
for fraud, while contract law limits remedies to the benefit of the 
                                                     
37. Id. (“A representation is a statement by the representer as to his existing state of mind 
regarding the existence of a past or present fact. Therefore, such liability as is imposed on a 
representer for stating something that proves to be false must be based on a tort theory.”); Barton, 
supra note 17, at 1834 (“[F]raud consists of a promise never intended to be performed (i.e., a lie) 
while breach consists of a promise intended to be performed but is not performed (i.e., a broken 
promise).”). 
38. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 95, at 656 (5th ed. 
1984) (“[W]arranty-representations or representations made under circumstances when the 
representee can reasonably regard the statements as manifestations of an intention to guarantee are 
the basis for contractual obligations and contract claims. Thus, a merchant-seller, in the absence of 
stipulations in the contract of sale clearly indicating the contrary, impliedly represents that the 
product he sells is merchantable and therefore reasonably fit for its primary purposes, and that he 
will give satisfaction of some kind if it is not.”). For an example of how a party’s assertion of fact 
can be an implied promise to give some sort of satisfaction if the fact proves to be false, consider 
the following: a seller tells the buyer that the cow he is selling will produce milk. This is an 
assertion of fact. But the parties might also consider this to be a promise that if the cow does not 
produce milk then the buyer can return the cow and get his money back. 
39. Id. 
40. Barton, supra note 17, at 1797. 
41. Id. at 1825. 
42. See William K. Jones, Product Defects Causing Commercial Loss: The Ascendancy of 
Contract over Tort, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 731, 738 (1990). 
43. Id. 
44. See Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Nat’l Tank Co., 414 N.E.2d 1302, 1314 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (“[A] 
cause of action for misrepresentation does not accrue until the injury is discovered.”), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part, 435 N.E.2d 443 (Ill. 1982); Thurin v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prods., Inc., Nos. 95-
2415, 95-3127, 1998 WL 378840, at *7 n.8 (Wis. Ct. App. July 9, 1998) (stating that the discovery 
rule applies to misrepresentation but not to contract claims). 
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bargain.45 Given all the benefits of tort law for plaintiffs, courts 
developed the economic loss rule to prevent plaintiffs from using tort 
law “to trump contract law and render the parties’ bargains and the 
careful allocation of duties and risks in the UCC meaningless.”46 
II. THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE IS MULTIFORM AND HAS 
MANY VARIATIONS 
Courts and commentators often refer to the economic loss rule as 
though it were one uniformly described and applied rule.47 In reality, it is 
“multiform rather than unitary in character.”48 For example, some 
variations of the rule bar intentional torts while others bar only 
negligence or strict liability suits.49 This Comment focuses on fraud, an 
intentional tort.50 In particular, it addresses the situation where a 
homeowner intentionally lies to a prospective homebuyer to induce the 
buyer to agree to purchase the home.51 Courts must decide whether the 
                                                     
45. See PETER A. ALCES, THE LAW OF FRAUDULENT TRANSACTIONS § 2.02[6][b][i], at 2-33 
(1989). 
46. Christopher Scott D’Angelo, The Economic Loss Doctrine: Saving Contract Warranty Law 
from Drowning in a Sea of Tort, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 591, 599 (1995). 
47. See Gary T. Schwartz, Economic Loss in American Tort Law: The Examples of J’Aire and of 
Products Liability, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 37, 37–38 (1986) (“In recent years . . . a number of 
scholars have each attempted to develop a general theory to cover the problem of tort law and 
economic loss . . . I recommend that we abandon any effort to formulate any single general 
theory.”). 
48. Id. at 38 (reasoning that the economic rule is multiform because “[u]nfair competition differs 
from fraud, which in turn differs from negligent misrepresentation, which in turn differs from the 
negligent polluting of public fishing waters, which in turn differs from the lawyer’s malpractice 
liability to his client (let alone to a range of third parties), which in turn differs from the destruction 
of buildings by fire, which in turn differs from compensating plaintiffs for lost income in personal 
injury suits”); see also F. Malcolm Cunningham, Jr. & Amy L. Fischer, The Economic Loss Rule: 
Deconstructing the Mixed Metaphor in Construction Cases, 33 TORT & INS. L.J. 147, 147 (1997) 
(describing the economic loss rule as a “multifaceted, seemingly inconsistent and ever changing 
doctrine”). 
49. DAN B. DOBBS & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADVANCED TORTS: 
ECONOMIC AND DIGNITARY TORTS 629 (2009). Compare Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 
150–51 (Cal. 1965) (barring only negligence and strict liability suits, not intentional tort claims), 
with Digicorp, Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., 662 N.W.2d 652, 665–66 (Wis. 2003) (barring an 
intentional tort claim). 
50. See supra note 16 (listing the elements of fraud). 
51. See, e.g., Poulsbo Grp., LLC v. Talon Dev., LLC, 155 Wash. App. 339, 343–44, 229 P.3d 
906, 908 (2010) (seller lied on a seller disclosure statement by stating that there were no pending or 
existing assessments against the property and lied by telling buyer that there would not be a 
latecomer assessment); Jackowski v. Borchelt, 151 Wash. App. 1, 7–8, 209 P.3d 514, 517 (2009) 
(sellers lied on the Form 17 Seller Disclosure Form, saying that there had been no damage from 
landslides, but they later amended the Form 17 saying that the property contained a Landslide 
Hazard Area). 
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buyer can sue for fraud or will be limited to bringing contract claims 
against the seller. Some jurisdictions allow the plaintiff to bring the 
fraud claims while others do not.52 
A. The Economic Loss Rule Balances Several Factors to Determine 
the Defendant’s Liability 
Courts do not employ a unitary economic loss rule to cover all types 
of tort claims. Instead, courts weigh a number of factors including 
whether the defendant supplied a product or information,53 whether the 
parties were in privity of contract,54 whether the plaintiff is seeking 
damages or rescission,55 and whether a contract claim is available.56 For 
example, in Jackowski v. Borchelt,57 a Washington appellate court case, 
purchasers of a waterfront home that was damaged in a landslide 
brought fraud and contract claims against the sellers, the sellers’ real 
estate agent, and their own real estate agent.58 The court held that the 
economic loss rule barred the purchasers’ tort claims against the 
sellers,59 but not their tort claims against the real estate agents.60 The 
court made the distinction between the private sellers and the real estate 
agents because it did not want the economic loss rule to “abrogate[] all 
                                                     
52. See discussion infra Part II.B (some courts have held that the economic loss rule does not bar 
fraud; some have held that it does not bar fraud claims that are independent of the contract; and 
some have held that it bars all fraud claims). 
53. Compare Seely, 403 P.2d at 151 (economic loss rule barred claim against the supplier of a 
product), with Jackowski, 151 Wash. App. at 14, 209 P.3d at 521 (economic loss rule does not bar 
claim against the supplier of information), and Hydro Investors, Inc. v. Trafalgar Power Inc., 227 
F.3d 8, 18 (2d Cir. 2000) (economic loss rule does not bar malpractice claims), and Collins v. 
Reynard, 607 N.E.2d 1185, 1187 (Ill. 1992) (clients can sue their lawyers in tort for malpractice 
even though the representation arose out of a lawyer-client contract).  
54. Compare Borish v. Russell, 155 Wash. App. 892, 904, 230 P.3d 646, 653 (2010) (discussing 
how the economic loss rule bars claims only when there was a contract between the parties), and 
Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Am. Aviation, Inc., 891 So. 2d 532, 534 (Fla. 2004) (reasoning that if 
the parties are not in privity of contract, the economic loss rule does not bar any tort claim other 
than one based on a product defect), with Seely, 403 P.2d at 148 (“Since there was an express 
warranty to plaintiff in the purchase order, no privity of contract was required.”). 
55. See, e.g., Jackowski, 151 Wash. App. at 13, 16, 209 P.3d at 520, 521 (economic loss rule bars 
claim seeking damages but not claim seeking rescission of contract). 
56. See, e.g., Hofstee v. Dow, 109 Wash. App. 537, 544–45, 36 P.3d 1073, 1077 (2001) (“Was 
the damage suffered by commercial parties who bargained at arm’s length for expectations that 
were frustrated, or was it an unexpected injury suffered by parties who could not negotiate to avoid 
the risk of the defective product?”). 
57. 151 Wash. App. 1, 209 P.3d 514 (2009). 
58. Id. at 6, 209 P.3d at 516–17. 
59. Id. at 13, 209 P.3d at 520. 
60. Id. at 15, 209 P.3d at 521. 
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professional malpractice claims, particularly where a client hires a 
professional and, therefore, establishes a privity of contract with that 
professional.”61 The court also held that the economic loss rule did not 
bar the plaintiffs’ claim against the sellers seeking rescission of the 
contract.62 As indicated in the introduction, this Comment focuses on the 
situation where a homebuyer sues the seller for fraud. In that context, a 
court is likely to find that the claim is barred by the economic loss rule 
because the claim is made against the seller, the parties are in privity of 
contract, and the plaintiff is seeking damages.63 
B. Courts Use Three Approaches to Determine Whether the Economic 
Loss Rule Bars Fraud 
Prior to 1995, only a handful of cases had applied the economic loss 
rule to bar fraud claims.64 It is perhaps a bit surprising that it took so 
long for the rule to develop in this context, because “[f]raud expressly 
allows for the recovery of purely economic losses arising out of a 
defendant’s misrepresentations in a sale of goods or other property.”65 
Prior to 1995, however, courts routinely allowed plaintiffs to recover 
purely economic losses for fraud claims when the defendant’s 
misrepresentation induced the transaction.66 Today, courts take one of 
three approaches: (1) the economic loss rule does not bar fraud claims 
(the “lenient” approach),67 (2) the economic loss rule bars fraud claims 
that are not “independent” of the contract (the “middle ground” 
                                                     
61. Id. at 14, 209 P.3d at 520. 
62. Id. at 16, 209 P.3d at 521. 
63. See supra notes 53–56. 
64. Barton, supra note 17, at 1802 (citing Huron Tool & Eng’g Co. v. Precision Consulting 
Servs., Inc., 532 N.W.2d 541, 544 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (“[T]he issue [of whether fraud is barred 
by the economic loss rule] has been addressed in only a handful of jurisdictions.”); see, e.g., N. 
States Power Co. v. Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 550 F. Supp. 108 (D. Minn. 1982) (addressing the 
question of whether the economic loss rule bars fraud that induces a contract); Moorman Mfg. Co. 
v. Nat’l Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443 (Ill. 1982) (addressing the question of whether the economic loss 
rule bars fraud claims generally). 
65. Barton, supra note 17, at 1803. 
66. Id. at 1802; see, e.g., Haarberg v. Schneider, 117 N.W.2d 796, 799 (Neb. 1962) (finding that 
the proper measure of damages in fraud is the difference between the value represented and the 
actual value); Stewart v. Potter, 104 P.2d 736, 739 (N.M. 1940) (holding defrauded purchaser could 
recover the difference between the real and represented value of the automobile); Clouse v. 
Chairtown Motors, Inc., 195 S.E.2d 327, 329 (N.C. Ct. App. 1973) (allowing recovery of purely 
economic loss in fraud). 
67. See, e.g., First Midwest Bank, N.A. v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 843 N.E.2d 327, 333 (Ill. 
2006); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Nat’l Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443, 452 (Ill. 1982). 
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approach),68 or (3) the economic loss rule bars all fraud claims (the 
“strict” approach).69 
Under the lenient approach, courts hold that the economic loss rule 
does not bar fraud claims because the duty not to commit fraud is 
independent of any contract.70 According to the Supreme Court of 
Texas, for example, there is “a duty to abstain from inducing another to 
enter into a contract through the use of fraudulent misrepresentations,” 
and this duty is “separate and independent from the duties established by 
the contract itself.”71 An essential difference between fraud and other 
torts barred by the economic loss rule is that fraud “impugns defendants’ 
conduct,” while other tort claims assail “the safety and efficacy of the 
product.”72 Plaintiffs can bring fraud claims without subverting contract 
law because the viability of a fraud claim depends only on the 
defendant’s conduct, not on the type of damage or on the existence of an 
underlying contract.73 
Under the middle ground approach, courts recognize an exception to 
the economic loss rule for fraud claims only where the 
misrepresentations are “independent” of the underlying contract.74 These 
jurisdictions consider misrepresentations to be related to an underlying 
contract if they concern the subject matter of the contract, such as the 
quality or characteristics of the goods.75 Thus, in a case where the 
defendant fraudulently induced the plaintiff to contract by making 
                                                     
68. See, e.g., Huron Tool & Eng’g Co. v. Precision Consulting Servs., Inc., 532 N.W.2d 541, 546 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (leading case); Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co. v. PPG Indus., Inc., 223 F.3d 
873, 884–87 (8th Cir. 2000); Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Am. Aviation, Inc., 891 So. 2d 532, 537 
(Fla. 2004). 
69. See, e.g., Nigrelli Sys., Inc., v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 31 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1138–39 
(E.D. Wis. 1999) (analyzing a plaintiff’s strict liability and fraud claims together and concluding 
that the economic loss rule applied “equally” to all the claims); In re Ford Motor Co. Bronco II 
Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL-991, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18207, at *21–22 (E.D. La. Dec. 4, 1995) 
(construing the New York economic loss rule to bar fraud claims). 
70. See, e.g., First Midwest Bank, 843 N.E.2d at 333; Moorman, 435 N.E.2d at 452. 
71. Formosa Plastics Corp. v. Presidio, 960 S.W.2d 41, 46–47 (Tex. 1998) (holding that the 
economic loss rule does not apply to fraud claims, regardless of whether the duties were later 
subsumed into a contract or whether the losses were purely economic). 
72. Kahn v. Shiley, Inc., 266 Cal. Rptr. 106, 112 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that a product 
manufacturer may be liable for fraud when it misleads potential users about material product 
information because fraud claims are not barred by the economic loss rule). 
73. Id.; see also Barton, supra note 17, at 1804. 
74. See, e.g., Huron Tool & Eng’g Co. v. Precision Consulting Servs., 532 N.W.2d 541, 546 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (leading case); Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co. v. PPG Indus., Inc., 223 F.3d 
873, 884–87 (8th Cir. 2000); Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am. V. Am. Aviation, Inc., 891 So. 2d 532, 537 
(Fla. 2004). 
75. Huron Tool, 532 N.W.2d at 546.  
07 - 051911 Heaton Post Author Final Read.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/21/2011  7:41 PM 
2011] WASHINGTON’S ECONOMIC LOSS RULE 341 
 
misrepresentations about the quality of the goods, the Michigan Court of 
Appeals found that there was no independent intentional 
misrepresentation and held that the economic loss rule barred the 
plaintiffs’ fraud claim.76 
To understand the essential difference between the lenient and middle 
ground approaches, consider a case where one party fraudulently induces 
the other party to enter into a contract. Fraud in the inducement occurs 
when one party makes a “[m]isrepresentation as to the terms, quality or 
other contractual relation, venture or other transaction that leads a person 
to agree to enter into the transaction with a false impression or 
understanding of the risks, duties or obligations she has undertaken.”77 
Thus, fraud in the inducement must always be “related to” the contract 
because the tort of fraud is the inducement of someone to enter into a 
contract.78 The tort itself, however, arises from the breach of the duty not 
to fraudulently induce another, and, thus, is always independent of the 
contract.79 Because fraud in the inducement must always be related to 
the contract, no jurisdiction that has adopted the middle ground position 
has ever found that a misrepresentation was independent of the 
contract.80 Thus, the practical effect of the middle ground makes it 
identical to the economic loss rule that bars all fraud in the inducement 
claims (the strict approach).81 
Under the strict approach, courts hold that the economic loss rule bars 
all fraud claims simply because fraud is a tort and the economic loss rule 
bars all tort claims.82 For example, in Flagg Energy Development Corp. 
                                                     
76. Id. 
77. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 661 (6th ed. 1990). “Fraud in the inducement” is just the tort of 
fraud where the facts indicate that the defendant lied to the plaintiff to get the plaintiff to enter into a 
contract. It is a subset of fraud, or one way of proving fraud, not a separate tort. Id. 
78. See Budgetel Inns, Inc. v. Micros Sys., Inc., 8 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1147 (E.D. Wis. 1998). 
79. See id. 
80. See id. at 1146 n.2. In Huron Tool, the Michigan Court of Appeals seemed to recognize that 
fraud that induces a contract is independent of the contract itself. 532 N.W.2d at 544. But then the 
court went on to define the “distinction between fraud in the inducement and other kinds of 
fraud . . . as the distinction . . . between fraud extraneous to the contract and fraud interwoven with 
the breach of contract.” Id. at 545. The court held that the “plaintiff may only pursue a claim for 
fraud in the inducement extraneous to the alleged breach of contract.” Id. at 546. Ultimately, the 
court held that the economic loss rule barred the plaintiff’s fraud claim because the 
misrepresentations concerned the quality and characteristics of the goods sold by the defendants 
and, thus, were “not extraneous to the contractual dispute.” Id. at 545. By imposing the additional 
requirement that the tort be extraneous to the contract, “the court vitiated the exception and for all 
practical purposes created no exception at all.” Barton, supra note 17, at 1833. 
81. See Budgetel, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 1147. 
82. See, e.g., Nigrelli Sys., Inc., v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 31 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1138–39 
(E.D. Wis. 1999) (analyzing a plaintiff’s strict liability and fraud claims together and concluding 
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v. General Motors Corp. Allison Gas Turbine Division,83 the plaintiff 
brought a fraud claim after the defendant’s misrepresentations about the 
quality of a product induced the plaintiff to purchase the product.84 The 
trial court dismissed the claim as barred by the economic loss rule and 
the Connecticut Supreme Court agreed, reasoning that fraud claims 
cannot arise out of a transaction governed by the UCC.85 
III. THE WASHINGTON STATE SUPREME COURT IS STILL 
DEVELOPING ITS ECONOMIC LOSS RULE 
In Washington, the state legislative originally created the economic 
loss rule. After the Washington State Supreme Court had initially 
rejected the economic loss rule, the legislature passed the Washington 
Products Liability Act (WPLA) to ensure its application to product 
purchase contracts.86 Following the legislature’s lead, the Washington 
State Supreme Court soon adopted a common law economic loss rule 
and expanded its coverage beyond the WPLA.87 As the Court continued 
to develop its rule, it considered whether the rule should bar torts like 
fraud. In Alejandre v. Bull, the Court noted that it was aware that some 
courts recognized a broad exception to the economic loss rule for fraud 
claims (the lenient approach), but the Court explicitly declined to say 
whether it would adopt such an exception.88 Washington’s appellate 
courts chose not to adopt the lenient approach and instead held that the 
economic loss rule barred all fraud claims except the narrow tort of 
fraudulent concealment.89 In Eastwood v. Horse Harbor Foundation, the 
                                                     
that the economic loss rule applied “equally” to all the claims); In re Ford Motor Co. Bronco II 
Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL-991, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18207, at *21–22 (E.D. La. Dec. 4, 1995) 
(construing the New York economic loss rule to bar fraud claims). 
83. 709 A.2d 1075 (Conn. 1998). 
84. Id. at 1087. 
85. Id. at 1089. 
86. Act of Apr. 17, 1981, ch. 27, 1981 Wash. Sess. Laws 112 (codified as amended at WASH. 
REV. CODE §§ 7.72.010–.070 (2010)); Stanton v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 123 Wash. 2d 64, 84, 866 
P.2d 15, 26 (1993). 
87. See Berschauer/Phillips Const. Co. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 124 Wash. 2d 816, 827, 881 P.2d 
986, 993 (1994). 
88. 159 Wash. 2d 674, 690 n.6, 153 P.3d 864, 872 n.6 (2007). 
89. See Poulsbo Grp., LLC v. Talon Dev., LLC, 155 Wash. App. 339, 347, 229 P.3d 906, 910 
(2010); Carlile v. Harbour Homes, Inc., 147 Wash. App. 193, 204–05, 194 P.3d 280, 285 (2008). 
Carlile discusses fraudulent concealment as though it were a completely separate tort from fraud. 
147 Wash. App. at 204–05, 194 P.3d at 285. This Comment will argue that the appellate courts’ 
distinction between fraud and fraudulent concealment does not make sense because fraudulent 
concealment is just a shorthand name for one way of proving fraud, not a separate tort. See infra 
Part IV.C. 
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Washington State Supreme Court responded to lower court treatment of 
the economic loss rule, holding that the rule does not bar a plaintiff from 
bringing a tort where the tort duty is independent of the contract.90 
A. The Washington State Supreme Court First Developed Its 
Economic Loss Rule in Response to the Washington Product 
Liability Act 
Although the economic loss rule has been almost universally 
accepted, 91 Washington courts originally chose not to adopt it.92 In Berg 
v. General Motors Corp.,93 the Washington State Supreme Court 
permitted a plaintiff to recover in tort for purely economic damages after 
a defectively manufactured engine malfunctioned during a commercial 
fishing trip.94 But the Berg rule did not last long. In 1981, the 
Washington State Legislature effectively overruled Berg by enacting the 
WPLA.95 The WPLA created an economic loss rule in the product 
liability context, limiting plaintiffs seeking purely economic damages to 
contract claims under the UCC.96 
A few years after the WPLA was enacted, the Washington State 
Supreme Court developed a common law economic loss rule to govern 
outside the product liability context. In Berschauer/Phillips 
Construction Co. v. Seattle School District,97 the plaintiff, a general 
contractor, brought a tort claim of negligent misrepresentation against an 
architect and a structural engineer, alleging that their inaccurate and 
incomplete engineering plans caused the plaintiff to spend more money 
and time to complete the construction project than originally 
anticipated.98 The plaintiff’s claims were not governed by the WPLA 
because architectural and engineering services are not “products” under 
                                                     
90. 170 Wash. 2d 380, 393, 241 P.3d 1256, 1264 (2010).  
91. See Esquibel, supra note 17, at 789. For a list of states that have adopted the economic loss 
rule, and for exceptions to the rule, with case citations, see D’Angelo, supra note 46, at 609. 
92. See Berg v. Gen. Motors Corp., 87 Wash. 2d 584, 594, 555 P.2d 818, 823 (1976). 
93. 87 Wash. 2d 584, 555 P.2d 818 (1976). 
94. Id. at 584, 594, 555 P.2d at 818, 823. 
95. Act of Apr. 17, 1981, ch. 27, 1981 Wash. Sess. Laws 112 (codified as amended at WASH. 
REV. CODE §§ 7.72.010–.070 (2010)); Stanton v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 123 Wash. 2d 64, 84, 866 
P.2d 15, 26 (1993) (“The Legislature overruled Berg and adopted the analysis of the Supreme Court 
of California in Seely v. White Motor Co., when it enacted the 1981 product liability act.” (citations 
omitted)). 
96. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 7.72.010–.070; Bayliner Marine Corp., 123 Wash. 2d at 84, 866 P.2d 
at 26. 
97. 124 Wash. 2d 816, 881 P.2d 986 (1994). 
98. Id. at 819–20, 881 P.2d at 988–89. 
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the WPLA.99 The Court reasoned that an economic loss rule was 
necessary to “ensure that the allocation of risk and the determination of 
potential future liability is based on what the parties bargained for in the 
contract.”100 Thus, the Court held that when parties have contracted to 
protect against potential economic liability, the economic loss rule bars 
the tort of negligent misrepresentation, even in cases that fall outside the 
WPLA.101 
B. In Alejandre, the Washington State Supreme Court Left Its 
Approach to Fraud Claims an Open Question 
After Berschauer/Phillips, the next Washington State Supreme Court 
case to develop the economic loss rule was Alejandre v. Bull. In 
Alejandre, the buyers discovered that the house they purchased had a 
defective septic system.102 They sued the seller, alleging fraud and 
misrepresentation.103 The Court held that the economic loss rule barred 
recovery for alleged breach of tort duties where a contractual 
relationship exists104 and the damage is “more properly remediable only 
in contract.”105 The Court reasoned that “tort law is not intended to 
compensate parties for losses suffered as a result of a breach of duties 
assumed only by agreement.”106 To determine whether the economic 
loss rule limits a plaintiff to contract remedies, the Court devised the 
following rule: 
The key inquiry is the nature of the loss and the manner in 
which it occurs, i.e., are the losses economic losses, with 
economic losses distinguished from personal injury or injury to 
other property. If the claimed loss is an economic loss, and no 
                                                     
99. See WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.010(3) (2010) (“‘Product’ means any object possessing 
intrinsic value, capable of delivery either as an assembled whole or as a component part or parts, 
and produced for introduction into trade or commerce.”); Berschauer/Phillips, 124 Wash. 2d at 822, 
881 P.2d at 990. 
100. Berschauer/Phillips, 124 Wash. 2d at 826, 881 P.2d at 992. 
101. Id. at 828, 881 P.2d at 993. 
102. Alejandre v. Bull, 159 Wash. 2d 674, 680, 153 P.3d 864, 867 (2007). 
103. Id. 
104. Although the economic loss rule applies only if a contractual relationship between the 
parties exists, the rule can bar a tort claim even when the specific risk of loss at issue was not 
expressly allocated in the parties’ contract. Id. at 688, 153 P.3d at 871. 
105. Id. at 681, 153 P.3d at 867 (quoting Berschauer/Phillips, 124 Wash. 2d at 822, 881 P.2d at 
990). 
106. Id. at 682, 153 P.3d at 868 (citing Factory Mkt., Inc. v. Schuller Int’l, Inc., 987 F. Supp. 387, 
395 (E.D. Pa. 1997)). 
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exception applies to the economic loss rule, then the parties will 
be limited to contractual remedies.107 
The Court in Alejandre held that the economic loss rule precluded a 
homebuyer’s negligent misrepresentation tort claim against the seller, 
but it noted that there are exceptions to the economic loss rule.108 In 
particular, the Court explicitly recognized that the economic loss rule 
does not bar fraudulent concealment claims.109 It is not entirely clear 
whether the Alejandre Court intended fraudulent concealment to be a 
completely distinct tort from fraud or if it intended fraudulent 
concealment to be a shorthand name for one way of proving fraud.110 
The Court merely explained that, to maintain a claim for fraudulent 
concealment, the plaintiff must prove that the vendor had a duty to 
disclose, which arises: 
(1) where the residential dwelling has a concealed defect; (2) the 
vendor has knowledge of the defect; (3) the defect presents a 
danger to the property, health, or life of the purchaser; (4) the 
defect is unknown to the purchaser; and (5) the defect would not 
be disclosed by a careful, reasonable inspection by the 
purchaser.111 
The plaintiffs in Alejandre failed to show that the defect in the septic 
system would not have been discovered through a reasonably diligent 
inspection.112 Had the plaintiffs been able to prove this element, the 
Court would have allowed them to recover for their purely economic 
losses.113 
Alejandre left open the possibility that fraudulent concealment is not 
the only exception to the economic loss rule.114 But the Court explicitly 
                                                     
107. Id. at 684, 153 P.3d at 869. 
108. Id. at 685–86, 153 P.3d at 870. 
109. Id. at 689, 153 P.3d at 871.  
110. In Carlile v. Harbor Homes, Inc., Division I of the Washington Court of Appeals said that 
fraudulent concealment is a completely separate tort from fraud (which it called intentional 
misrepresentation), and that the two tort claims have different elements. 147 Wash. App. 193, 204–
05, 194 P.3d 280, 285–86 (2008). In Part IV.C., this Comment argues that fraudulent concealment is 
just a type of fraud. This Comment uses the term “fraudulent concealment” as a shorthand name for 
one way of proving fraud, but that usage does not intend to endorse the view that fraudulent 
concealment is a distinct tort. 
111. Alejandre, 159 Wash. 2d at 689, 153 P.3d at 872. 
112. Id. at 689–90, 153 P.3d at 872. 
113. Id. at 689, 153 P.3d at 871–72 (“[T]he Alejandres’ fraudulent concealment claim is not 
precluded by the economic loss rule. However, the fraudulent concealment claim fails because, as 
the trial court ruled, the Alejandres failed to present sufficient evidence to support the claim.”). 
114. Id. at 690 n.6, 153 P.3d at 872 n.6 (“The Alejandres urge the court to hold that the economic 
loss rule does not apply to claims of fraud in the inducement, and they argue their fraud claims are 
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declined to resolve the question of whether the economic loss rule has an 
exception for fraud generally or if there is an exception only for a certain 
subset of fraud claims.115 The Court noted that “some courts recognize a 
broad exception to the economic loss rule that applies to intentional 
fraud,” while other courts take a middle ground position, recognizing an 
exception to the economic loss rule for fraud claims where the 
misrepresentations are extraneous to the contract itself.116 Ultimately, the 
Court chose not to decide which approach it would take.117 
C. The Washington Appellate Courts Decided that the Economic Loss 
Rule Barred All Fraud Claims Except for “Fraudulent 
Concealment” 
After Alejandre, Washington appellate courts continued to develop 
the application of Alejandre’s economic loss rule to homebuyers’ tort 
claims.118 At first, they appeared to disagree about the answer to 
Alejandre’s open question: whether there is an exception for all fraud or 
only for fraudulent concealment.119 Ultimately they decided that the only 
recognized exception to the economic loss rule was for fraudulent 
concealment.120 
                                                     
claims of fraud in the inducement . . . We need not address the question whether any or all 
fraudulent representation claims should be foreclosed by the economic loss rule because we resolve 
the Alejandres’ fraudulent representation claims on other grounds.”). 
115. Id. (“We need not address the question whether any or all fraudulent representation claims 
should be foreclosed by the economic loss rule because we resolve the Alejandres’ fraudulent 
representation claims on other grounds.”). 
116. Id.  
117. Id. 
118. See, e.g., Poulsbo Grp., LLC v. Talon Dev., LLC, 155 Wash. App. 339, 345–47, 229 P.3d 
906, 909–10 (2010); Cox v. O’Brien, 150 Wash. App. 24, 34–36, 206 P.3d 682, 687–88 (2009); 
Jackowski v. Borchelt, 151 Wash. App. 1, 12–15, 209 P.3d 514, 519–21 (2009); Carlile v. Harbour 
Homes, Inc., 147 Wash. App. 193, 203–07, 194 P.3d 280, 285–87 (2008); Stieneke v. Russi, 145 
Wash. App. 544, 555–65, 190 P.3d 60, 66–70 (2008); Baddeley v. Seek, 138 Wash. App. 333, 337–
40, 156 P.3d 959, 961–62 (2007).  
119. Compare Jackowski, 151 Wash. App. at 17, 209 P.3d at 522 (citing Alejandre for the 
proposition that neither fraud nor fraudulent concealment claims are barred by the economic loss 
rule), and Stieneke, 145 Wash. App. at 560, 190 P.3d at 68 (allowing the plaintiff to get to the merits 
of his fraud claim because “[t]he Alejandre court reaffirmed that the economic loss rule does not 
apply to claims of fraud”), and Baddeley, 138 Wash. App. at 338, 156 P.3d at 961 (allowing the 
plaintiff to get to the merits of his fraud claim because “[m]any outside jurisdictions have held the 
economic loss rule does not bar fraud”), with Carlile, 147 Wash. App. at 204–05, 194 P.3d at 285–
86 (interpreting Alejandre as creating an exception to the economic loss rule for fraudulent 
concealment but not other kinds of fraud). 
120. Carlile, 147 Wash. App. at 204–05, 194 P.3d at 285–86 (recognizing an exception for 
fraudulent concealment but holding that the exception does not extend to intentional 
misrepresentation claims); Poulsbo, 155 Wash. App. at 347, 229 P.3d at 910 (same).  
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In Carlile v. Harbour Homes, Inc., Division I of the Washington 
Court of Appeals held that the economic loss rule barred a homebuyer’s 
fraud claim.121 The plaintiffs in Carlile sued the developer of their 
residential property for misrepresentation and breach of contract, 
alleging that their homes had construction defects.122 The court 
compared the elements of a fraudulent concealment claim with the 
elements of a general fraud claim.123 Because of the differences between 
the elements, the court concluded that the two should not receive the 
same treatment.124 The court found that “there is no reason here to 
exempt an intentional misrepresentation claim from the general 
exclusion of tort-based claims under the rationale of the economic loss 
rule.”125 But Carlile failed to articulate a rationale for why the economic 
loss rule should preclude fraud claims. The court interpreted Alejandre 
as creating one narrow exception to the economic loss rule for fraudulent 
concealment, and it declined to extend this exception to other types of 
fraud.126 
In Poulsbo Group, LLC v. Talon Development, LLC, the plaintiffs 
asked Division II of the Washington Court of Appeals to conclude that 
the economic loss rule does not bar fraud claims, contrary to the ruling 
of Division I in Carlile.127 After analyzing Alejandre, Division II agreed 
with the Carlile court.128 The Poulsbo court reasoned that the 
overarching rule in Alejandre required that “[p]arties should be limited 
to contract remedies when a loss potentially implicates contract and tort 
relief.”129 Similar to Carlile, however, the court failed to articulate a 
reason for why the economic loss rule should bar fraud claims when it 
does not bar fraudulent concealment claims. 
                                                     
121. Carlile, 147 Wash. App. at 206, 194 P.3d at 286. 
122. Id. at 198–99, 194 P.3d at 282. 
123. Id. at 204–05, 194 P.3d at 285–86. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. at 205, 194 P.3d at 286.  
126. Carlile discusses fraudulent concealment as though it were a completely separate tort from 
fraud. Id. at 204–05, 194 P.3d at 285–86. This Comment argues that the appellate courts’ distinction 
between fraud and fraudulent concealment does not make sense because fraudulent concealment is 
just a shorthand name for one way of proving fraud, not a separate tort. See infra Part IV.C. 
127. Poulsbo Grp., LLC v. Talon Dev., LLC, 155 Wash. App. 339, 346, 229 P.3d 906, 910 
(2010).  
128. Id. at 347, 229 P.3d at 910. 
129. Id. 
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D. In Eastwood, the Washington State Supreme Court Held that the 
Economic Loss Rule Does Not Bar Torts that Arise Independent of 
the Contract 
On November 4, 2010, the Washington State Supreme Court finally 
brought some clarity to Alejandre. In Eastwood v. Horse Harbor 
Foundation, the lessor of a horse farm sued the lessee for breach of 
lease, which was a contract claim, and the commission of waste, which 
was a tort claim.130 The Washington State Supreme Court held that the 
economic loss rule does not bar a plaintiff from bringing a tort claim 
where the tort duty is independent of the contract.131 To underscore this 
point and help alleviate the appellate court confusion, the Court 
abandoned the term “economic loss rule” and renamed this rule the 
“independent duty doctrine.”132 The Court explained that “[t]he term 
‘economic loss rule’ has proved to be a misnomer. It gives the 
impression that this is a rule of general application and any time there is 
an economic loss, there can never be recovery in tort.”133 
The Eastwood Court explicitly rejected the courts of appeals’ broad 
reading of Alejandre.134 Despite Alejandre’s pronouncement that the key 
inquiry is whether the loss is an economic loss,135 the economic loss rule 
does not bar a plaintiff from bringing a tort claim simply because the 
injury is an economic loss and the parties have a contractual 
relationship.136 The Court explained that in the past, when it has held 
that the economic loss rule applies, “what we have meant is that 
considerations of common sense, justice, policy, and precedent in a 
particular set of circumstances led us to the legal conclusion that the 
                                                     
130. 170 Wash. 2d 380, 384, 241 P.3d 1256, 1259 (2010). 
131. Id. at 393, 241 P.3d at 1264. 
132. Id. at 402, 241 P.3d at 1268. 
133. Id. at 387–88, 241 P.3d at 1261. 
134. Id. (“Seeing both a contractual relationship and an economic loss, the Court of Appeals 
believed that Alejandre therefore compelled a holding that Eastwood’s only remedy was a recovery 
for breach of lease. The Court of Appeals’ broad reading of this court’s jurisprudence on the 
economic loss rule, while perhaps understandable, is not correct.” (internal citation omitted)). 
135. Alejandre v. Bull, 159 Wash. 2d 674, 684, 153 P.3d 864, 869 (2007) (“The key inquiry is the 
nature of the loss and the manner in which it occurs, i.e., are the losses economic losses, with 
economic losses distinguished from personal injury or injury to other property. If the claimed loss is 
an economic loss, and no exception applies to the economic loss rule, then the parties will be limited 
to contractual remedies.”). 
136. Eastwood, 170 Wash. 2d at 388–89, 241 P.3d at 1261 (“Thus, the fact that an injury is an 
economic loss or the parties also have a contractual relationship is not an adequate ground, by itself, 
for holding that a plaintiff is limited to contract remedies.”). 
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defendant did not owe a duty.”137 Under Eastwood, the key to 
distinguishing cases where the plaintiff can recover in tort from those 
where the plaintiff is limited to contract remedies is to analyze whether 
there is an independent tort duty.138 As the Court explained, “[a]n injury 
is remediable in tort if it traces back to the breach of a tort duty arising 
independently of the terms of the contract.”139 
This newly authored independent duty doctrine is not limited to the 
tort of waste; it applies to all torts.140 After setting out its new approach 
to the economic loss rule, the Court concluded that the defendant in 
Eastwood had violated a tort duty that was independent of the contract’s 
existence.141 The Washington State Supreme Court reaffirmed its new 
                                                     
137. Id. at 389, 241 P.3d at 1262. 
138. By requiring a case-by-case analysis of whether there is an independent tort duty, Eastwood 
limits the defendant’s liability by limiting the defendant’s scope of duty. Id. Courts can limit a 
defendant’s liability either by limiting the defendant’s scope of duty or by finding that the damages 
were not “proximately caused” by the defendant’s actions. Barrett, supra note 18, at 898–99. For 
another example in which the court limited the defendant’s liability by limiting his scope of duty, 
see Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931). In Ultramares, an accountant 
negligently prepared a financial statement. The accountant was sued by a person who did not have a 
contract with the accountant but had relied on the accountant’s accuracy. Id. at 442–43. Then-Judge 
Cardozo limited the defendant’s liability by holding that an accountant owes no duty to third parties 
to refrain from negligently causing economic injury. Id. at 444. The other method of limiting a 
defendant’s liability is to recognize that the defendant does owe a duty to the plaintiff, but hold that 
the damages are sufficiently remote that the defendant’s act did not proximately cause the plaintiff’s 
harm. See, e.g., H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138, 153 (N.J. 1983) (extending an 
accountant’s malpractice duty to all foreseeable plaintiffs). When courts say that the plaintiff did not 
proximately cause the harm, they mean that, “because of convenience, of public policy, of a rough 
sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain point.” 
Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting). A court can 
use either method to define the boundaries of the defendant’s liability, but the scope-of-duty 
analysis has been more popular with the courts than proximate cause analysis. See JOHN L. 
DIAMOND ET AL., UNDERSTANDING TORTS 187 (1996). 
139. Eastwood, 170 Wash. 2d at 389, 241 P.3d at 1262. 
140. This conclusion is evident from the fact that the Court speaks very generally about torts and, 
only after developing the new rule, goes on to discuss the tort of waste in particular. See, e.g., id. at 
393, 241 P.3d at 1264 (“In sum, the economic loss rule does not bar recovery in tort when the 
defendant’s alleged misconduct implicates a tort duty that arises independently of the terms of the 
contract.”); id. at 398, 241 P.3d at 1266 (“Having described what we now will call the independent 
duty doctrine, we next must decide whether the duty to not cause waste arises independently of the 
contract.”). 
141. Id. at 402, 241 P.3d at 1268 (“We hold the duty to not cause waste is an obligation that 
arises independently of the terms of a lease covenant, and sufficient evidence supported the trial 
court’s findings of a causal connection between Eastwood’s losses and a breach of this independent 
duty. Thus, the Court of Appeals was mistaken to hold Eastwood could not recover tort damages for 
waste.”). 
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approach to the economic loss rule in Affiliated FM Insurance Co. v. 
LTK Consulting Services, Inc.,142 decided the same day.143 
IV. WASHINGTON SHOULD ADOPT THE LENIENT APPROACH 
SO THAT ITS ECONOMIC LOSS RULE DOES NOT BAR 
FRAUD CLAIMS 
The Washington State Supreme Court has renamed its “economic loss 
rule” the “independent duty doctrine.”144 The shift in the rule’s name 
highlights the essential feature of Washington’s new take on the 
economic loss rule, namely that it “does not bar recovery in tort when 
the defendant’s alleged misconduct implicates a tort duty that arises 
independently of the terms of the contract.”145 Eastwood addressed the 
general question of when a plaintiff can sue in tort law. The natural 
implication of this decision is that Washington’s courts should adopt the 
lenient approach with respect to fraud, holding that the economic loss 
rule does not bar fraud claims, because the duty not to commit fraud is 
independent of any contract.146 
When the appellate courts held that the economic loss rule barred all 
fraud except for fraudulent concealment, they did so based on a broad 
reading of Alejandre. Eastwood has now explicitly rejected that broad 
reading.147 Moreover, the appellate courts’ determination that parties to a 
                                                     
142. 170 Wash. 2d 442, 243 P.3d 521 (2010). After the Seattle monorail caught fire, its operating 
company suffered millions of dollars in losses. Id. at 443–44, 243 P.3d at 523. The company sued 
an engineering firm that worked on the monorail maintenance for negligently causing the fire, a tort. 
Id. at 444, 243 P.3d at 523. The engineering firm argued that the operating company’s tort claim 
was barred by the economic loss rule because the losses were purely economic. Id. The Washington 
State Supreme Court disagreed, citing Eastwood’s independent duty doctrine. Id. at 449, 243 P.3d at 
526. The Court held that the tort law duty of reasonable care was independent of the contractual 
obligations. Id. at 453–54, 243 P.3d at 528–29.  
143. Id. Washington’s new approach has already been recognized by the federal courts. See Putz 
v. Golden, No. C10-0741JLR, 2010 WL 5071270 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 7, 2010); Trinity Glass Int’l, 
Inc. v. LG Chem., Ltd., No. 09-5018RJB, 2010 WL 5071295 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 7, 2010). 
144. Eastwood, 170 Wash. 2d at 402, 241 P.3d at 1268; see supra Part III.D. 
145. Id. at 393, 241 P.3d at 1264. 
146. See, e.g., Barton, supra note 17, at 1834–35 (“If the duty arises solely from a provision 
contained within the contract, then the plaintiff has asserted a contract action. Conversely, if the 
plaintiff’s allegations concern misrepresentations made during contract negotiations, then the claim 
is a tort. Mere failure to perform a contract does not constitute fraud, but a party can be held liable 
for fraud when that party makes a misrepresentation without the intent to perform and another party 
is induced into a transaction. So long as the allegation concerns a misrepresentation made prior to 
the contract that induced the contract, it is a fraudulent inducement claim.”). 
147. Eastwood, 170 Wash. 2d at 387, 241 P.3d at 1261 (“Seeing both a contractual relationship 
and an economic loss, the Court of Appeals believed that Alejandre therefore compelled a holding 
that [the plaintiff’s] only remedy was a recovery for breach of [contract]. The Court of Appeals’ 
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contract cannot sue for fraud will undermine the UCC and lead to an 
uncertain marketplace. Thus, contrary to Carlile and Poulsbo, the 
answer to Alejandre’s open question should be that the economic loss 
rule does not bar any fraud claims. 
A. Barring Fraud Claims Would Create an Uncertain Marketplace 
If Washington’s economic loss rule is misunderstood and the lower 
courts continue to hold that the economic loss rule precludes fraud 
claims, this misunderstanding “would create an uncertain marketplace—
where sellers would not be held to their representations and buyers could 
not rely on explicit representations by the seller.”148 According to Judge 
Posner, such a rule would increase costs for all commercial transactions 
because the only way for parties to obtain legal protection against fraud 
would be through contract law, which would require the parties to insist 
that all representations are incorporated into the contract itself.149 Thus, 
“there will be additional contractual negotiations, contracts will be 
longer, and, in short, transaction costs will be higher.”150 Moreover, it is 
impossible to account for every contingency in a contract.151 Thus, 
parties could never be completely protected by the terms of their 
contracts. 
Even if the parties attempt to protect themselves from being 
defrauded through explicit contract provisions, it would be impossible 
for parties to obtain complete protection because “[a] party to a contract 
cannot rationally calculate the possibility that the other party will 
deliberately misrepresent terms critical to that contract.”152 If parties 
could always discern when the other party is lying, there would be no 
problem. But it is often difficult to determine when someone is lying. If 
a party “cannot rely on the opposite party to speak truthfully during 
negotiations regarding the subject matter of the contract—if they cannot 
tell what is a lie and what is not,” then “[h]ow can parties freely allocate 
risk”?153 Contracts cannot adequately protect parties from the possibility 
                                                     
broad reading of this court’s jurisprudence on the economic loss rule, while perhaps understandable, 
is not correct.” (internal citation omitted)). 
148. Barton, supra note 17, at 1832 (citing Stoughton Trailers, Inc. v. Henkel Corp., 965 F. Supp. 
1227, 1236 (W.D. Wis. 1997)). 
149. All-Tech Telecom, Inc. v. Amway Corp., 174 F.3d 862, 867 (7th Cir. 1999). 
150. Id. 
151. See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 299–301 (2004). 
152. Stoughton Trailers, 965 F. Supp. at 1236. 
153. Budgetel Inns, Inc. v. Micros Sys., Inc., 8 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1148 (E.D. Wis. 1998). 
07 - 051911 Heaton Post Author Final Read.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/21/2011  7:41 PM 
352 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86:331 
 
that the other party is lying. This inability to account for dishonesty is 
why it is necessary to supplement contract law with common law claims 
like the tort of fraud. 
The best way to minimize costs is to require the party with the best 
access to information to disclose the information: 
When a seller is lying about the subject matter of the contract, 
the party best situated to assess the risk of economic loss and 
allocate the risk is not the buyer, who cannot possibly know 
which of several statements may be a lie, but rather the seller, 
who clearly knows.154 
If the economic loss rule bars fraud claims, “the innocent nonbreaching 
party would bear the burden of trying to police deceitful activity that 
society as a whole abhors.”155 Moreover, “no interest of society is served 
by promoting the flow of information not genuinely believed by its 
maker to be true.”156 Thus, “[p]ublic policy is better served by leaving 
the possibility of an intentional tort suit hanging over the head of a party 
considering outright fraud.”157 
B. The UCC Does Not, and Was Never Intended to, Eliminate Fraud 
Claims 
Some courts have held that the economic loss rule bars all fraud 
claims because they reason that fraud claims are inconsistent with breach 
of contract and breach of warranty allegations under the UCC.158 In 
addition, some courts have “misconstrued” the UCC’s goal of promoting 
uniformity in commercial transactions to mean that “the UCC provides 
the exclusive source of rights and remedies for parties engaged in the 
commercial sale of goods.”159 However, “the UCC does not, and was 
never intended to, eliminate or restrict” fraud claims.160 
One of the fundamental assumptions underlying the UCC is that 
“parties to a transaction are bargaining in good faith and are able to 
                                                     
154. Id. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. (quoting Ollerman v. O’Rourke Co., 288 N.W.2d 95, 112 (Wis. 1980)). 
157. Stoughton Trailers, 965 F. Supp. at 1236. 
158. See, e.g., Flagg Energy Dev. Corp. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 709 A.2d 1075, 1088–89 (Conn. 
1998) (Fraud claims are “presumptively inconsistent with postacceptance claims for breach of 
warranty.” (emphasis in original)).  
159. Steven C. Tourek et al., Bucking the “Trend”: The Uniform Commercial Code, the 
Economic Loss Doctrine, and Common Law Causes of Action for Fraud and Misrepresentation, 84 
IOWA L. REV. 875, 875 (1999). 
160. Id. at 876. 
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fairly assess and allocate any risks of liability relating to the purchase 
and subsequent use of the goods.”161 When one party commits fraud, that 
party is not operating in good faith, and it is therefore impossible for the 
other party to assess and allocate risks properly.162 Thus, preventing 
parties from suing for fraud would undermine the UCC.163 Several 
sections of the UCC “affirmatively underscore the ongoing coexistence 
of common law fraud rights and remedies.”164 For instance, section 1-
103 of the UCC explicitly states that common law fraud “shall 
supplement its provisions.”165 
Rather than displacing common law fraud claims, the UCC 
supplements the common law remedies for fraud.166 In particular, UCC 
section 2-721, entitled “Remedies for Fraud,” provides that “[r]emedies 
for material misrepresentation or fraud include all remedies available 
under this Article for non-fraudulent breach.”167 Section 2-721 does not 
displace fraud and misrepresentation claims; rather, it “affirmatively and 
favorably acknowledges these causes of action by supplementing the 
common law remedies for fraud and misrepresentation with all remedies 
that are available under the UCC.”168 Moreover, fraud claims are 
consistent with the spirit of the UCC, as evinced by section 1-304, which 
imposes “an obligation of good faith” in every contract or duty to which 
the UCC applies.169 It is inconsistent to limit a plaintiff’s ability to bring 
a fraud claim, requiring him to seek contract remedies instead, when 
contract law was designed to be supplemented by just such a fraud 
claim. 
                                                     
161. Id. at 877. 
162. Id. 
163. Id. 
164. Id. at 881. 
165. U.C.C. § 1-103 (2003) (“Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the 
principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract, 
principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or 
other validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions.”). 
166. Tourek et al., supra note 159, at 891. 
167. U.C.C. § 2-721 (2010). 
168. Tourek et al., supra note 159, at 881. 
169. U.C.C. § 1-304 (2004). 
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C. In Light of Eastwood, Washington Courts Should Adopt the Lenient 
Approach and Hold that the Economic Loss Rule Does Not Bar 
Fraud Claims 
Under Eastwood’s economic loss rule, the plaintiff can bring a tort 
claim whenever the defendant violated a tort duty that is independent of 
the defendant’s contract with the plaintiff.170 Jurisdictions that take the 
lenient approach, holding that the economic loss rule does not bar fraud 
claims, do so because they recognize that the duty not to commit fraud is 
independent of any contract.171 In contrast, jurisdictions that take a 
middle ground position recognize an exception to the economic loss rule 
only for “independent” fraud claims, which means that the fraud does 
not involve a misrepresentation about the subject matter of the 
underlying contract.172 Requiring that the fraud itself be independent of 
the contract is not the same thing as requiring the tort duty to be 
independent of the contract. For example, if the tort relates to the signing 
of a contract, the tort itself has already occurred by the time the contract 
is signed.173 If a cause of action arises before the parties enter into a 
contract, the tort duty must be independent of the contract because no 
duty has yet been created under the contract.174 By focusing on whether 
the tort duty is independent of the contract, Eastwood is in line with the 
lenient-approach jurisdictions. 
Courts taking the middle ground approach have a legitimate desire to 
prevent a plaintiff from subverting contract law by casting a contract 
claim as a tort claim of fraud. Ensuring that the tort duty is independent 
of the contract, however, maintains a clear border between tort law and 
contract law.175 For example, although fraud in the inducement is an 
independent tort claim,176 non-performance of a contract obligation is a 
contract claim that a plaintiff might try to call “fraudulent 
                                                     
170. Eastwood v. Horse Harbor Found., 170 Wash. 2d 380, 389, 241 P.3d 1256, 1262 (2010). 
171. See supra Part II.B. 
172. See supra Part II.B. 
173. Budgetel Inns, Inc. v. Micros Sys., Inc., 8 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1147 (E.D. Wis. 1998). 
174. Id. (“The fact that the tort by definition also relates to the signing of a contract does not alter 
the fact that by the time the contract is signed the action causing the tort has already occurred.”). 
175. Faricelli, supra note 27, at 740–41 (“Sellers are not faced with an independent duty to 
protect buyers from economic loss; rather that duty is provided for by the parties’ mutual agreement 
or contract. On the other hand, there is a common-law duty not to induce another into a contract by 
fraudulent means.” (footnotes omitted)). 
176. “Fraud in the inducement” is just the tort of fraud where the facts indicate that the defendant 
lied to the plaintiff to get the plaintiff to enter into a contract. It is a subset of fraud, or one way of 
proving fraud, not a separate tort. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 661 (6th ed. 1990). 
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performance.”177 Although they may seem similar, “[t]here is a 
considerable difference between a promise never intended to be 
performed (fraud in the inducement) and a promise intended to be 
performed but which ultimately is not (breach of contract).”178 While the 
duty to protect against fraud in the inducement is independent of any 
underlying contract, the duty to protect against fraudulent performance 
of a contract derives directly from the contract itself.179 Eastwood’s 
formulation of the economic loss rule will allow a plaintiff to bring all 
fraud in the inducement claims but will preclude fraudulent performance 
claims, because the contract itself is the only source of the duty to 
perform a contract obligation.180 Thus, an independent duty analysis 
maintains the line between tort and contract. 
In light of the Washington State Supreme Court’s decision in 
Eastwood, the two appellate court cases that held that the economic loss 
rule bars all fraud claims except for fraudulent concealment should be 
overruled. The holding of Division II in Poulsbo was based purely on its 
interpretation of Alejandre that the economic loss rule barred a plaintiff 
from bringing tort claims when contract remedies exist.181 Eastwood 
explicitly rejected this broad reading of Alejandre.182 Poulsbo is 
therefore inconsistent with Eastwood and should be overruled. 
Although Carlile’s holding was based on a more in-depth 
consideration of Alejandre and the tort of fraud, it too should be 
                                                     
177. See Barton, supra note 17, at 1835 (“The economic loss rule clearly seeks to prevent the 
mere recasting of a contract claim sounding as a tort of fraud in the inducement, because tort law 
does not protect parties from breach of duties assumed only by agreement.” (footnotes omitted)). 
“Fraudulent performance” is just a badly named contract claim and is not a type of fraud. See, e.g., 
Sun Co. (R&M) v. Badger Design & Constr., Inc., 939 F. Supp. 365, 370 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (“[M]ere 
non-performance . . . is not evidence of fraud.”).  
178. Budgetel, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 1147. 
179. Faricelli, supra note 27, at 730. 
180. Eastwood v. Horse Harbor Found., 170 Wash. 2d 380, 394 n.4, 241 P.3d 1256, 1264 n.4 
(2010) (“When a court says, ‘the economic loss rule applies,’ the court is simply articulating a 
conclusion that, in a particular set of circumstances, the law of contracts is the only source of a 
defendant’s obligations and no tort duty exists.”). 
181. Poulsbo Grp., LLC v. Talon Dev., LLC, 155 Wash. App. 339, 346, 229 P.3d 906, 910 
(2010) (“The overarching rule in Alejandre guides us here: Parties should be limited to contract 
remedies when a loss potentially implicates contract and tort relief. Thus, the economic loss rule 
bars [the plaintiff’s] intentional misrepresentation claim because contract remedies exist.” (internal 
citation omitted)). 
182. Eastwood, 170 Wash. 2d at 387, 241 P.3d at 1261 (“Seeing both a contractual relationship 
and an economic loss, the Court of Appeals believed that Alejandre therefore compelled a holding 
that [the plaintiff’s] only remedy was a recovery for breach of [contract]. The Court of Appeals’ 
broad reading of this court’s jurisprudence on the economic loss rule, while perhaps understandable, 
is not correct.”). 
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overruled. Carlile determined that the exception to the economic loss 
rule for fraudulent concealment did not extend to fraud because the 
elements of fraud differed from the elements of fraudulent 
concealment.183 This analysis demonstrates both a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the tort of fraud and a misinterpretation of 
Alejandre. When the Court in Alejandre listed five elements that were 
necessary for the plaintiffs to prove their fraudulent concealment claim, 
it did not state that these were the five elements of fraudulent 
concealment.184 Rather, the Court said that these were the elements 
necessary to prove that the vendor had a duty to speak.185 
Fraudulent concealment is a type of fraud, not a separate tort. 
Roughly speaking, fraud occurs when (1) the defendant makes a 
misrepresentation, (2) knows or believes it to be false, (3) makes the 
misrepresentation with the intent of influencing the plaintiff’s conduct, 
(4) the representation is material, and (5) the plaintiff’s reliance upon the 
representation was justified.186 Fraudulent concealment is simply fraud 
where, instead of explicitly saying something false, the defendant makes 
a misrepresentation by failing to speak.187 To make a claim for 
fraudulent concealment, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant had a 
duty to speak.188 But proving that the defendant had a duty to speak is 
                                                     
183. Carlile v. Harbour Homes, Inc., 147 Wash. App. 193, 204–05, 194 P.3d 208, 285–86 (2008) 
(“A claim for fraudulent concealment requires a plaintiff to show: (1) [that] the residential dwelling 
has a concealed defect; (2) the vendor has knowledge of the defect; (3) the defect presents a danger 
to the property, health, or life of the purchaser; (4) the defect is unknown to the purchaser; and (5) 
the defect would not be disclosed by a careful, reasonable inspection by the purchaser. The nine 
elements of intentional misrepresentation (fraud) are: (1) representation of an existing fact; (2) 
materiality; (3) falsity; (4) the speaker’s knowledge of its falsity; (5) intent of the speaker that it 
should be acted upon by the plaintiff; (6) plaintiff’s ignorance of its falsity; (7) plaintiff’s reliance 
on the truth of the representation; (8) plaintiff’s right to rely upon the representation; and (9) 
damages suffered by the plaintiff. Given the difference in elements between the two types of claims, 
there is no reason to conclude that an intentional misrepresentation claim should be treated the same 
as the fraudulent concealment claim in Alejandre.” (footnotes omitted)). 
184. See Alejandre v. Bull, 159 Wash. 2d 674, 689, 153 P.3d 864, 872 (2007). 
185. Id. 
186. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525; see also W. Coast, Inc. v. Snohomish Cnty., 
112 Wash. App. 200, 206, 48 P.3d 997, 1000 (2002) (“(1) representation of an existing fact; (2) 
materiality; (3) falsity; (4) the speaker’s knowledge of its falsity; (5) intent of the speaker that it 
should be acted upon by the plaintiff; (6) plaintiff’s ignorance of its falsity; (7) plaintiff’s reliance 
on the truth of the representation; (8) plaintiff’s right to rely upon the representation; and (9) 
damages suffered by the plaintiff.”). 
187. Tourek et al., supra note 159, at 883 (“If the supplier makes an express material 
misstatement regarding a product transaction, he is guilty of [fraud]. If he withholds information 
when he should speak, he is guilty of fraudulent concealment.”). 
188. If there is no duty to speak, the defendant cannot be held liable for failing to speak. See 
Alejandre, 159 Wash. 2d at 689, 153 P.3d at 872. 
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not the same as proving that the defendant committed fraudulent 
concealment: the elements that Alejandre listed are not the elements of 
fraudulent concealment. The Carlile court misunderstood Alejandre. 
Moreover, Carlile’s conclusion that the economic loss rule bars all fraud 
except for fraudulent concealment does not make common sense: it 
allows a plaintiff to sue the defendant for failing to speak but not for 
intentionally lying. Thus, Carlile should be overruled. 
CONCLUSION 
The economic loss rule was intended to keep parties from casting 
their contract claims as tort claims. Because fraud claims supplement 
contract claims, rather than replace or subvert them, they should not be 
barred by the economic loss rule. The UCC itself explicitly contemplates 
that common law fraud claims may supplement its provisions by 
ensuring that parties are not free to make intentional misrepresentations. 
Without this tort of fraud available to them, contracting parties could 
never fully trust each other. This lack of trust would create an uncertain 
marketplace because it is impossible to draft contract provisions to 
sufficiently guard against intentional misrepresentations. In light of 
Eastwood’s new independent duty doctrine, Washington’s economic loss 
rule should not bar fraud claims because the duty not to commit fraud is 
independent of any contract. Thus, it is imperative that Washington’s 
courts hold that the economic loss rule does not bar fraud claims. 
 
